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The primate cortical visual system is branched, with two streams emerging from early visual 
areas: a dorsal stream that extends into parietal cortex and a ventral stream that extends into 
temporal cortex. This anatomical division underlies a functional one, initially conceptualized by 
Leslie Ungerleider and Mortimer Mishkin who characterized the dorsal stream as a where stream 
for spatial vision and the ventral stream as a what stream for object vision.1 This conception was 
modified by David Milner and Melvyn Goodale who focused on the output of each stream, 
characterizing the ventral stream as supporting vision for perception, so informing decision 
making, planning, memory and thought, broadly conceptual activities, and the dorsal stream as 
supporting vision for action, processing precise spatial information to inform accurate on-line 
motor movement.2 Interestingly, they argued that vision supported by the dorsal stream is 
unconscious: “[our view is] committed to the claim that dorsally mediated coding of objects for 
visually guided action does not contribute to how those objects or scenes are represented in 
conscious visual experience.”3 Riffing on the philosophical notion of zombies as creatures 
devoid of phenomenal consciousness, visually guided motor actions are zombie actions. Zombie 
actions are guided by unconscious subject level visual states. I have previously argued in support 
of this position.4  
Milner and Goodale’s account of the two visual streams has, to put it mildly, had a 
tremendous influence on theories of consciousness (talk of the two visual stream hypothesis will 
refer to their account). Andy Clark deployed the hypothesis to argue against Experienced Based 
Control: 
 
*I am grateful to a referee for this journal for helpful comments. The content of this paper was 
presented in different forms at The Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness in 
Western Ontario, the Keck Neuroscience Department at Claremont McKenna, Pitzer and Scripps 
Colleges, the departments of philosophy at Carnegie Mellon University, Southern Methodist 
University, and Washington University, St. Louis. Thanks to the participants of those events for 
their comments. I am grateful to Ian Phillips for comments on an earlier version of this 
manuscript. 
 
1 Leslie G Ungerleider and Mortimer Mishkin, “Two Cortical Visual Systems,” in David J. Ingle, 
Melvyn A. Goodale, & Richard J. W. Mansfield, eds., Analysis of Visual Behaviour (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1982), pp. 549-86. 
2 David A. Milner and Melvyn A. Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
3 Robert T. Foley, Robert L. Whitwell, and Melvyn A. Goodale, “The Two-Visual-Systems 
Hypothesis and the Perspectival Features of Visual Experience,” Consciousness and Cognition 
XXXV (September, 2015) pp. 225–33 at p. 228. 
4 Wayne Wu, “The Case for Zombie Agency,” Mind CXXII, 485 (2013): 217–230. See also 
Joshua Shepherd, “Conscious Action/Zombie Action,” Noûs L, 2 (2016): 419–44. Refuting one’s 
previous view is painful, but given that I have argued for zombie action and here, for its 
negation, I suppose anyone interested in vision and action could be satisfied by something I have 
written. 
 
The contents of conscious visual experience, are typically active in the control and 
guidance of our fine-tuned, real-time engagements with the surrounding three-
dimensional world.5 
 
Clark’s influential article gave rise to further debates with Christopher Mole and Morgan 
Wallhagen in opposition.6 I argued for expanding Clark’s perspective to cover ordinary human 
action in neurologically intact individuals.7 There has been further debate about how to 
understand the two visual stream hypothesis in relation to agency and awareness.8 In short, the 
empirical theory of cortical vision has had a substantial impact on theories of visual 
consciousness and its role in human agency by downgrading visual experience’s role in the 
control of action.  
I argue here against the empirical case for zombie action. Introspection provides crucial 
data for that case, but it cannot provide reliable data needed to divide the relevant theoretical 
possibilities. In arguing against introspection, I do not proceed from a general skepticism about 
it.9 Rather, I draw on the functional anatomy of the visual system to cast doubt on the relevance 
of introspection in this context. After noting recent empirical developments about primate vision 
(section 1), I present the empirical argument that the dorsal stream is unconscious (section 2). 
This argument assumes introspective reliability. To assess whether introspection is reliable, I 
draw on common philosophical accounts of introspection that make central a role for attention. 
Attention allows us to ground introspective judgment on the experience it is about. I argue (1) 
that on the two visual stream hypothesis, introspecting visual experience is realized in the ventral 
stream as part of vision for perception (section 3). This means (2) that introspective reports 
provide information about the ventral and not the dorsal stream. As such, (3) they cannot be used 
to draw conclusions about the dorsal stream as assumed by the empirical argument (section 4). 
Therefore, the empirical argument for unconscious vision is unsound. Support then comes from 
philosophical arguments for unconscious vision that impose a narrow access condition on 
phenomenal consciousness. In the final section, I suggest that this standard assumption begs the 
question regarding the relation between consciousness and agency, specifically in respect of an 
intentional access condition on consciousness. I argue that this condition provides an important 
option for understanding the relation between consciousness and access, and that we should 
consider anew such possibilities for how agency and consciousness are related. 
 
5 Andy Clark, “Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?” Philosophical 
Review CX, 4 (2001): 495–520, at p. 496. 
6 Christopher Mole, “Illusions, Demonstratives and the Zombie Action Hypothesis,” Mind 
CXVIII, 472: 995–1011.  Morgan Wallhagen, “Consciousness and Action: Does Cognitive 
Science Support (Mild) Epiphenomenalism?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
LVIII, 3 (2007): 539-6. 
7 Wu, “The Case for Zombie Agency” op. cit. For a response, see Christopher Mole, “Embodied 
Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu,” Mind CXXII, 485 (2013): 231–39. 
8 Robert Briscoe and John Schwenkler, “Conscious Vision in Action,” Cognitive Science 
XXXIX, 7 (2015): 1435–67. See also Wayne Wu, “Against Division: Consciousness, 
Information and the Visual Streams.” Mind and Language XXIX, 4 (2014): 383–406. 
9 As Eric Schwitzgebel, Perplexities of Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011). 
 
 
1. Parcellation of the Dorsal Stream: A Brief Update 
 
The dorsal stream can be subdivided. Dwight Kravitz et al. identify three substreams within the 
dorsal stream: (a) a parieto-prefrontal pathway tied to spatial working memory and eye 
movements; (b) a parieto-premotor pathway tied to the guidance of motor movements and (c) a 
parieto-medial temporal pathway tied to the medial temporal lobe including the hippocampus.10 
Given their role in memory among other outputs, the parieto-prefrontal and parieto-medial 
temporal pathways can be construed as “for perception” in Milner and Goodale’s sense. 
 In discussion with a number of neuroscientists of vision, I have been struck by the fact 
that many of them do not see the dorsal stream to be unconscious, particularly those who work in 
monkey electrophysiology. As one eminent neuroscientist noted to me: neurologists would be 
surprised to hear that parietal lesions do not affect visual experience. In their original parcellation 
of primate vision, Ungerleider and Miskin cited evidence of focal parietal lesions as affecting 
perception.11 Recent evidence has suggested that posterior regions of the dorsal stream are 
involved in vision for perception by informing visual judgments regarding objects. In macaque 
monkeys, microstimulation of dorsal stream area CIP (caudal intraparietal area) activates regions 
in the ventral stream while inactivation of CIP affects judgments of depth.12 Similarly, 
behavioral work suggests that posterior areas of the dorsal stream contribute to perceptual 
judgment.13 
 For our purposes, these developments, while potentially narrowing the area of 
unconscious dorsal visual processing, leave the basic idea intact: there is unconscious dorsal 
stream visual processing tied to the control of motor actions, say processing in the parieto-
premotor pathway. This leaves Clark’s original claim untouched: much of everyday visuomotor 
action is zombie action. 
 
2. Empirical Arguments that the Dorsal Stream is Unconscious 
 
The primary empirical argument for unconscious vision is driven by a conflict between two 
behavioral data points: (A) the subject reliably visually guides behavior to a target V yet (B) the 
subject denies seeing V. If we think of (A) as providing an objective measure, for example 
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percent correct performance in an observable task, and (B) as relying on a subjective measure, 
namely introspective report of one’s experience, then the empirical argument for unconscious 
vision runs as follows: 
 
1. Objective measure: Subject S shows reliable visually guided behavior to V. 
2. Subjective measure: Subject S denies seeing V. 
3. If (1) is reliable, we conclude that the subject sees V. 
4. If (2) is reliable, we conclude that the subject does not see V. 
5. (1) is reliable in the relevant context. 
6. (2) is reliable (in the relevant context). 
7. By (1)-(6): the evidence supports the subject’s simultaneously seeing and not seeing V. 
 
To resolve the conflict in (7): 
 
8. Best explanation: (2) demonstrates absence of consciousness, (1) demonstrates presence 
of seeing, so together, they implicate a case of unconscious seeing. 
 
That is, we have subject-level visual episodes that lack phenomenal consciousness. This 
argument form has been deployed drawing on the cases of blindsight and of the visual agnosic 
patient DF.  
The second premise draws on the subject’s introspective reports and the fourth assumes 
the reliability of those reports. The subjective measure is needed to address the issue of 
consciousness directly. Subjects’ introspective judgments that they do not see are routinely 
treated as authoritative, yet we should not simply assume that introspection in this context is 
reliable. For example, the subjects at issue have suffered brain lesions. Neuropsychology never 
simply assumes that cognitive capacities remain intact in light of brain damage. In studies with 
neuropsychological patients, a battery of tests are applied to ascertain reliable cognitive and 
perceptual capacity, say in language processing, perception, attention and memory. 
Unfortunately, we have no analogous test for introspective reliability. This should give us pause 
in simply accepting introspective measures, for introspective capacity could be affected by brain 
lesions. 
Data regarding the patient DF allows us to run the empirical argument for unconscious 
vision. DF has ventral stream damage in the lateral occipital area (area LO) which is functionally 
tied to processing form. Though she has preserved color and texture discrimination, DF is unable 
to detect or discriminate basic aspects of form.14 In a striking experiment, DF was asked to 
indicate the orientation of a vertical slot. This is a ventral stream task in that it involves using 
visual experience to inform report, a conceptual task. In this case, DF uses her hands to report a 
specific orientation and her performance accuracy is at chance. She also emphasizes that she 
cannot see the orientation. This provides the data for premise 2. Strikingly, if DF is asked to post 
an item through the slot, a dorsal stream task, her accuracy is essentially equivalent to that of 
neurologically intact controls. DF is reliable in this posting task, and the result provides the data 
for premise 1. The conclusion then is that the visual state that guides DF’s motor movement is 
unconscious. Since vision for action is served by the dorsal stream, DF’s dorsal stream is 
unconscious.  
 
14 David A. Milner and Melvyn A. Goodale, The Visual Brain in Action, op. cit.  
We can strengthen the evidential basis for zombie action by appeal to the larger set of 
blindsight subjects with preserved motor capacity. It is now held that blindsight subjects see 
unconsciously. A number of them demonstrate reliable motor behavior towards objects that they 
deny seeing.15 Running the empirical argument from these cases, we conclude that motor actions 
in blindsight are guided by unconscious vision. Since such actions are dorsal stream mediated, 
the dorsal stream substantiates unconscious vision.  
Introspection is a discrimination and detection capacity, so one can introspectively detect 
conscious states and discriminate their phenomenal features. A discrimination and detection 
capacity is positively reliable if it increases the likelihood above chance that judgments based on 
it regarding the item discriminated and detected are correct. We should not, however, assume 
that a detection and discrimination capacity is reliable in every arbitrary context. For example, 
perception, a paradigm discrimination/detection capacity, is not reliable across all contexts. This 
is partly due to internal and external noise. It can also be due to the failure of certain necessary 
conditions for reliability. If a perceptual judgment is based on experience in a context in which 
perceptual experience is generally unreliable, then the judgment is less likely to be true, perhaps 
a guess (chance performance), or even consistently false (negatively reliable; consider perceptual 
judgments based on hallucination). Perception scientists often design experiments in contexts 
where perception is reliable and avoid unreliable contexts, say when they decide on appropriate 
test stimuli or when they determine presentation times. Deployments of introspection should be 
similarly sensitive to whether the context of deployment will yield reliable data. 
 To generate usable data, the deployment of discrimination and detection capacities must 
occur under reliable conditions. These conditions will vary from context to context. If noise and 
other contextual conditions modulate reliability of brain-based detection capacities like 
perception, they also challenge other brain-based detection capacities like introspection. The 
infallibility of introspection cannot be assumed. The fact that introspection is fallible points to its 
context varying reliability. Accordingly, we must ask of any introspective data whether it was 
generated in a reliable context. If we can show that introspective data is not reliable, then we 
should not use it.  
Unlike perceptual judgment where stimulus presentation can be tightly controlled and 
perceptual reports assessed for accuracy, there is no corresponding method for assessing 
introspective accuracy. This makes it difficult to meet the reliability condition for use of 
introspective data. How might we then assess introspective reliability? I shall not address the 
general question but focus on the specific case of assessing introspection in arguments for 
unconscious vision in action.16 Introspection is not reliable regarding dorsal stream vision.  
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3. Attention and Introspection 
 
What does introspection of visual consciousness involve? The question asks for a psychological 
model of introspection of visual consciousness, yet we lack a detailed model. To move in this 
direction, I deploy an insight from philosophers that ties introspection to attention. For example, 
Brie Gertler writes: 
 
By focusing your attention on the phenomenal quality of [an experience], you can come 
to know something about your current experience. Philosophers generally agree on this 
much.17  
 
Philosophers conceive of introspective attention as an internally directed capacity that can be 
turned towards mental states. Lycan suggests that this is in fact how introspecting seems: 
 
When we attend to our own mental states, it feels like that is just what we are doing: 
focusing our internal attention on something that is there for us to discern.18 
 
Janet Levin ties attention to discrimination: 
 
If I'm having more than one experience at a time…then I can denote distinct neural-
particulars, respectively, as “this,” “that,” and so on, as long as I can discriminate among 
these experiences and successively direct my introspective attention to them at that 
time.19 
 
There are many others who endorse a similar picture. Strikingly, while these philosophers often 
diverge in how they think about the metaphysics of consciousness, they converge on a central 
role for attention in informing introspective judgments about consciousness. Such introspective 
attention can directly target conscious perceptual states so as to inform judgments about those 
states. As the spotlight is a standard metaphor for visual attention, I’ll call this picture of 
introspective attention the inner spotlight model.  
 In contrast to Lycan’s claim that introspective attention seems to be directed inward, 
Gilbert Harman noted: 
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Look at a tree and try to turn your attention to intrinsic features of your visual experience. 
I predict you will find that the only features there to turn your attention to will be features 
of the presented tree.20  
 
Perhaps Harman means that introspective attention is, paradoxically, just perceptual attention. 
The seeming paradox can be alleviated if we understand introspective attention as referring not 
to an inwardly directed form of attention but a form of attention whose function is to ground an 
inward form of judgment, an introspective judgment. Introspective attention is whatever form of 
attention serves introspective judgment. Harman’s point resonates with an account of 
introspection suggested by Gareth Evans: 
 
[A] subject can gain knowledge about his internal informational states [e.g. perceptual 
experience] in a very simple way: by re‐using precisely those skills of conceptualization 
that he uses to make judgments about the world. Here is how he can do it. He goes 
through exactly the same procedure as he would go through if he were trying to make the 
judgment about how it is at this place now...he may prefix this result with the operator "It 
seems as though..."21 
 
We can amend this. A subject in a position to perceptually judge that something is an F can 
redeploy this conceptual ability by going through the procedure of making that judgment but 
prefix the result with the operator, “I see that/I see an__.” For the cases we shall discuss, we can 
move from a perceptual judgment that there is no F to the introspective judgment I do not see an 
F. Thus, when looking for one’s keys on a cluttered table, we visually search for them with 
attention. Our judgment that the keys are not there is founded on this detection activity. If we can 
report that the keys are not present, we can also report not seeing the keys.22  
 Perceptual judgments about specific items require perceptual attention to those items. 
That is the function of selective attention. Consider the standard case where we make a visual 
judgment about some visible property P instantiated by an object. This object instantiates a 
number of visible properties, but our judgment is about only one property. That our thought is 
selective in being about P rather than other properties is not happenstance. Rather, the selectivity 
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manifold” to ascertain that a certain visual phenomenology is present or missing. This would be 
a more complicated psychological task. The point is that the process eventuating in a judgment 
that one does not see F is likely to be more complex than talk of “noting an absence” suggests. 
That said, both models of introspection can agree that introspection of the absence of something 
in the phenomenal field requires introspective detection by attention. This requires that 
conditions for reliable attention are met. That suffices for our current purposes. 
of the resulting judgment is explained by the fact that we visually attend to the relevant property 
(what psychologists call feature attention). Without visual attention to a target, we would not be 
able to form vision-based judgments about that target.  
This claim has substantial empirical support. Consider the manipulation of attention in 
the inattentional blindness, change blindness, and attentional blink paradigms. Each of these 
demonstrate that (a) if a target is presented while attention is directed away from it as in 
inattentional blindness, 23 (b) if the target (a change) is presented under conditions of a mask that 
disrupts visual integration over time,24 or (c) if the target follows too closely in time after 
attention has been directed to an earlier item,25 subjects do not notice and hence are unaware of 
the target. If one thinks that forming a perceptual judgment about a target X requires noticing 
and being aware of it, then these attentional manipulations give evidence to the necessity of 
attention to X in order for a subject to respond to X and a fortiori to form a judgment about it. In 
these experiments, subjects fail to report the target and deny that there is such a target. 
Inattention to X leads to failure of awareness of it. If so, one can hardly form a judgment about it 
without further information. Accordingly, when Evans emphasizes the redeployment of 
capacities needed for perceptual judgment for reuse in introspection, this entails that attention as 
deployed in perceptual judgment is reused in introspection.  
Despite their differences, the two accounts of introspection we have been discussing 
converge on attention as central to explaining the selectivity of introspective judgment. 
Crucially, both theories, when conjoined with the two visual stream hypothesis, map 
introspective processes to the ventral stream. Begin with the Evansian account. Perceptual 
judgment is a ventral stream mediated activity since it requires vision for perception, namely 
vision in the service of conceptual response. There is ample evidence for selective attentional 
effects in the ventral stream. For example, attentional selection is demonstrated in monkey 
electrophysiology during goal-directed tasks where neurons in area V4 at the base of the ventral 
stream and inferotemporal cortex later in the stream contract their receptive fields around task 
relevant targets.26 Thus, in visually guided judgment, a conscious visual state that represents 
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some target X forms the basis for a visual based judgment about X given that the subject visually 
attends to X.  
Now deploy Evans’ redeployment hypothesis: visual attention in respect of the visual 
experience of X informs not just a perceptual judgment about X but an introspective judgment 
that one sees X. Since introspective judgment is a conceptual response that is guided by the 
visual experience in question, it is a ventral stream mediated process reliant on attentional 
selection in the ventral stream. Evans’ redeployment hypothesis thus implicates the reuse of the 
ventral stream processes that inform perceptual judgment to inform an introspective judgment.  
 The mapping of the inner spotlight account is less straightforward since it does not 
engage with empirical work. That said, attention as an inner spotlight functions to link the visual 
experience to an introspective judgment about it, and this requires an information link between 
experience and judgment. After all, one directly introspects an experience to read-off its 
phenomenal properties. Once this is acknowledged, inner spotlight views converge on the 
empirical upshot of the Evansian proposal. For how might the inner spotlight link a visual 
experience to judgment? The two visual stream account identifies the ventral stream as the core 
neural basis for visual experience, and it holds that information processing needed for informing 
conceptual response in vision for perception goes through information processing in the ventral 
stream. Accordingly, whatever the inner spotlight is, its attentional influence must also go 
through the information processing of the ventral stream so that a specific visual experience 
informs an introspective judgment about it. Thus, to generate an introspective report about a 
visual experience, introspection must involve vision for perception.  
Both accounts of introspection then share an assumption about attention as expressed in 




The arrow indicates that the information link set up between the visual state and the judgment 
about it is due to attention. This link allows us to put flesh on the bones of Evans’ idea that 
introspective judgment, in his sense of redeployment, can be intelligibly reliable. For where 
perceptual judgment is reliable, this depends on an informative information link between the 
ventral stream based visual experience of the item judged, say an object that is F, and the 
application of the observational concept F in the judgment. A redeployment of that reliable link 
to form the introspective judgment that one sees an F suggests that such judgments will be 
reliable since they will be based on the ventral stream mediated experience of actually seeing an 
F. Accordingly, introspection of visual experience is grounded in attentional processes that link 
ventral stream mediated experience to conceptual capacities deployed in judgement. We have 
thus given introspection a biological grounding on the basis of the two visual stream hypothesis. 
 This biological account of introspection of visual experience assumes an informational 
condition. The judgments in question are grounded precisely because there is an information link 
between judgment and experience. It is necessary for the judgments to be reliable that they are 
based on some information link to what the judgment is of. Otherwise, such judgments are 
effectively guesses. Thus, if I have no perceptual or other access to some object behind me, say 
access to your testimony or my memory of it, I am in no position to render reliable judgments 
regarding it. My guesses do not support dividing among epistemic possibilities regarding that 
object. 
This applies to phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, this necessary condition is invoked by 
Michael Cohen and Daniel Dennett in their perfect experiment against Ned Block’s claim that 
the phenomenal overflows access.27 Cohen and Dennett imagine with overflow theorists that 
early visual areas might generate a conscious visual state even if all the circuits that enable 
access to that state are eliminated. They suggest, however, that without access, no evidence 
regarding conscious vision is available. Block, they argue, is not then in a position to provide 
evidence regarding conscious experience independent of access since it is access that provides 
such evidence. It is enough for our purposes that since introspection depends on access to the 
conscious state, then the absence of appropriate information links to that state renders 
introspective judgments about it non-evidential because they are not informationally connected 
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this is sufficient to undercut the evidential status of introspective judgments. They are not 
appropriately based on experience. This means, however, that if the same holds for dorsal stream 




introspective judgments regarding dorsal stream mediated vision cannot decide the issue between 
the thesis that the dorsal stream is unconscious versus the opposing thesis that it is conscious. I 
shall argue that given the two visual stream hypothesis, the link required for adequate access is 
not present, so the empirical argument is not sound.  
 
4. Introspection of Dorsal Stream Vision is not Reliable 
 
I argue that the introspective reports provided by DF and relevant blindsight subjects target 
visual states that are subserved by the ventral stream and not the dorsal stream. Accordingly, 
their reports do not provide information about the dorsal stream, so do not settle possibilities 
concerning it. Arguments that assume the reliability of these reports mistake the actual target of 
those judgments and as a result, are not sound.  
 Consider DFs claim that she does not see the orientation of the slot despite being able to 
visually guide an accurate motor movement in respect of the slot’s orientation. Let us assume 
that her introspection is reliable in that she can recognize that her visual experience lacks a 
certain feature present in normal visual experience, namely the phenomenology associated with 
seeing the orientation of a line. Given this ability to detect an absence, via introspective attention, 
her introspective judgment should be correct: she does not see the orientation of the line. Yet if 
the judgment that her experience lacks a feature is correct, that judgment is correct about ventral 
stream mediated experience, namely regarding a defect in it. Given the assumption of functional 
segregation between the streams, this judgment is then not about the dorsal stream mediated 
visual state and should not be interpreted as such. To do so is to assume something false. Yet this 
is what the empirical argument for an unconscious dorsal stream assumes. Hence the argument is 
not sound. 
Let us put the point functionally. As I argued, introspection of visual experience is a 
ventral stream mediated activity. DF retains preserved color and texture perception but damage 
to visual area LO renders her ventral stream unable to compute form and orientation. Thus, when 
DF judges that her visual experience is lacking a certain feature, we can understand her to be 
correct (how she renders that judgment will not be explained here). Her recognition of a 
phenomenal feature being absent from her visual experience is informed by a ventral stream 
mediated state that lacks that feature precisely because of damage to area LO. So, if DF’s 
introspection is correct, it is explained by her detecting deficiencies in ventral stream mediated 
experience. Yet by the two visual system hypothesis, the visual state that informs her 
introspective judgment is not served by the dorsal stream since the dorsal stream is not for 
perception, namely it is not for conceptual response. Rather, it is for the guidance of motor 
movement. It follows that DF’s reliable introspective judgment that she does not see the line 
does not amount to a report based on and concerned with her dorsal stream visual state. Her 
introspective judgment does not provide information about what is going on in the dorsal stream 
and cannot be used in an argument about that stream. Her introspective judgment about not 
seeing is a judgment about a defect in the ventral and not the dorsal stream. To treat her 
judgment as being informative about consciousness in the dorsal stream is to confuse the actual 
import of her judgment. 
If Milner and Goodale are correct, there is a functional disconnection between the two 
streams. For the argument for unconscious vision to work, DF’s claims that she does not see 
must give information about deficiencies or absences in the dorsal stream in respect of visual 
awareness. Her claims can do this only if there is an informational link between the dorsal stream 
and her conceptual response where the dorsal stream informs that response. Yet this is what the 
visual stream hypothesis denies. This means that without the necessary informational connection 
between dorsal stream and conceptual judgment capacities, DF’s introspection cannot give 
evidence for the nature of dorsal stream vision, assuming she draws on no other informational 
sources concerning that stream.  
Given the lack of an informational connection between dorsal stream visual states and 
introspective judgments, a theorist using DFs introspective reports to draw inferences about the 
dorsal stream would be at best guessing. At worst, the inferences would generate false 
conclusions about the dorsal stream since the information provided by such reports in fact 
concerns the damaged ventral stream. To draw on the visual search case as an analogy, if we 
wished to make a judgment about whether our keys are on the dining room table, we could 
hardly do better than guess if we were in a different room from which the table is not visible and 
we did not draw on other information. Thus, for all we know from DF’s introspective report, her 
dorsal stream might still be conscious regarding a relevant visual parameter. Critically, the 
argument for zombie action misinterprets DFs report, mistaking a reliable report about the 
ventral stream for a reliable report about the dorsal stream.  
The challenge extends to blindsight subjects who are able to perform motor actions 
despite damage to primary visual cortex (V1). Anatomically, blindsight subjects can rely on 
dorsal stream processing in guiding motor behavior even though given that V1 activity is 
abolished, the ventral stream lacks its normal cortical visual input and will remain functionally 
dormant in the face of a visible stimulus. The blindsight subject seems blind to that stimulus. 
Objective behavior seen in blindsight such as accurate motor response to a visible stimulus in the 
subject’s blind field is driven by dorsal stream processing drawing on visual inputs that bypass 
the damaged area of V1, probably through subcortical connections.  
Like DF, blindsight subjects who say that they cannot see the visual features to which 
their motor actions can be successfully directed can be understood to correctly detect a defect in 
visual experience. In their case, it is the functional inactivity of the ventral stream corresponding 
to their blind visual field due to a lesion in V1. Yet given the two visual stream hypothesis, the 
blindsight subject’s introspective report is based on ventral stream deficiencies and not dorsal 
stream processing. In the blindsight case, the defect in ventral stream processing is tied to 
damage in V1. Failure of V1 to respond to a stimulus leads to failure of normally correlated 
ventral stream activity. Since the ventral stream will not be active, the subject will report not 
seeing anything at all corresponding to the blind field. If the report is correct about experience, it 
is correct about ventral stream, not dorsal stream, deficiencies. We recapitulate in blindsight the 
problem with the argument for an unconscious dorsal stream appealing to DF’s introspection: the 
subjects do not have introspective access to the dorsal stream and the visual states that it 
subserves. The required link on which attention would operate is not there.28 
The empirical argument for unconscious vision in the dorsal stream is based on the 
assumption that introspection is reliable in providing evidence about that stream. Yet the cited 
introspective reports, being based on ventral stream functioning, namely on vision for perception 
(conceptualization), do not provide evidence regarding the dorsal stream, namely vision for 
 
28 In Wu, “The Case for Zombie Action”, op. cit., I argued from cases of neurologically intact 
subjects undergoing the Ebbinghaus illusion to the conclusion that their movements exemplified 
zombie action. Accordingly, in a common form of visually guided reach-and-grasp movement, 
vision is unconscious. I argued that each stream assigned a different size to the same object so 
that if the dorsal stream were conscious and consciousness is (plausibly) unified, the subject 
would visually experience a contradictory spatial content. I assumed that subjects did not since 
contradictory contents would be uncanny, noticeable, and introspectable. Yet subjects did not 
notice such contents (they did not report any such content). If my current argument is correct, my 
earlier assumption about introspection is incorrect. See also Christopher Mole, “Embodied 
Demonstratives: A Reply to Wu,” Mind, CXXII, 485 (2013): 231–39. 
 
action. If so, introspective reports are not reliable regarding the nature of the dorsal stream. The 
argument for unconscious vision, in assuming the reliability of introspective reports regarding 
the dorsal stream, is unsound.  
 
5. Agency and Consciousness 
 
I focused on empirical arguments for zombie action because philosophical discussions have 
drawn on the science as compelling grounds for downgrading the role of visual consciousness in 
agency. Those arguments make assumptions about introspection that are incorrect. Accordingly, 
to defend zombie action, we must fall back on nonempirical arguments for unconscious vision in 
the dorsal stream. For example: 
 
1. If the dorsal stream is a phenomenally conscious stream, then it is introspectable.  
2. If it is introspectable, then it would be a form of vision for perception. 
3. It is not vision for perception.  
4. The dorsal stream is not a conscious stream. 
 
The underlying idea is that phenomenally conscious states must be accessible. One of Milner and 
Goodale’s arguments for the dorsal stream being unconscious draws on access.29 The first 
premise is an instance of the access condition: if a state is phenomenally conscious, then it is 
accessible, that is, it can be access conscious. Vision for perception identifies the relevant sense 
of access, one that fits Block’s account of access:  
 
A state is access-conscious (A-conscious) if, in virtue of one's having the state, a 
representation of its content is (A) inferentially promiscuous…that is, poised for use as a 
premise in reasoning, (B) poised for rational control of action, and (C) poised for rational 
control of speech.30  
 
In fact, we can discern two separable conditions, a requirement for conceptualization in (A) as 
needed for reasoning, hence conceptual access, and for the rational control of action as in (B), 
hence rational access (Block suggests (C) is not necessary).31 I speak of conceptual access 
because Block emphasizes (A) as presumably necessary. The force of (A) is that the subjects 
can, in principle, conceptualize and reason about what they are responding to. Given the 
conjunction of (A) and (B), this narrows the relevant notion of access to requiring 
conceptualization as well as the control of action.  
 
29 A. David Milner, “Conscious and Unconscious Visual Processing in the Human Brain,” In 
Frontiers of Consciousness, Lawrence Weiskrantz and Martin Davies eds., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 169-214. 
 
30 Ned Block “On a Confusion about Consciousness,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, XVIII, 
(1995): 227-87, at p. 231. I have changed Block’s numbering scheme to letters and removed a 
reference. 
31 Declan Smithies, “What is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought,” The Journal 
of Philosophy, CVIII, 1 (January, 2011): 5-34. I am grateful to a referee who prompted 
clarifications here. 
I acknowledge that (1), the access condition, is widely endorsed (recall Cohen and 
Dennett’s challenge to Block). The argument, however, is no longer empirical in that it relies 
primarily on an epistemic and metaphysical assumption about consciousness. One might think 
that (1) is empirically supported. Experimental work is thought to support the necessity of 
access, as seen in the debate about phenomenal overflow, the claim that phenomenal 
consciousness can obtain independently of access. Given that many understand access to imply 
entry to the global workspace through attention as a gate,32 many opponents of overflow endorse 
the necessity of attention for phenomenal consciousness. Even without the global workspace 
account, introspection implies attention. Proponents of (1) then cite extensive work on 
inattentional blindness, change blindness, the inattentional blink, and hemispatial neglect as 
empirical confirmation that without access, there is no phenomenal awareness. These results, 
however, provide no empirical support for either the conceptual access condition or access tied 
to introspection in premise (1).  
Proponents of premise (1) point out that overflow theorists have not presented a case of 
phenomenal consciousness outside of access. Overflow theorists are taken to face an impossible 
task. To provide evidence for phenomenal consciousness requires access in introspection, yet the 
challenge posed is to demonstrate phenomenal consciousness without access. This demand rules 
out appealing to introspection to detect overflow phenomenology since that just violates a core 
condition in the challenge. Hence, the overflow thesis is thought to be unverifiable. 
 Yet the sword cuts both ways. If access challenges overflow, it equally challenges its 
opponents. The access condition identifies a necessary condition: one is phenomenally conscious 
of X, only if one is able to access X. How does one confirm this empirically? We test necessary 
conditions by eliminating the condition identified in the consequent and verifying the absence of 
the condition expressed by the antecedent. This is standard empirical methodology. Hence, we 
must eliminate accessibility and demonstrate that consciousness is eliminated. Yet the problem 
that undercuts the empirical case for overflow also undercuts the empirical case for its denial. 
When one eliminates accessibility, one eliminates the access needed to detect the presence or 
absence of consciousness. If we are barred in gathering evidence for the presence of 
consciousness in the absence of accessibility, we are similarly barred from gathering evidence 
for the absence of consciousness. So if overflow is empirically unverifiable, so is the opposing 
position behind premise (1).  
Some ridicule the overflow position as subject to the refrigerator light fallacy: one attends 
to the light by opening the fridge and assumes that when one is not attending to it when the door 
is shut, the light remains on. Yet how does one know that the light is off when the door is closed? 
Anti-overflow theorists must show that when the door closes, the light goes off, but how can they 
do so if opening the door is our only form of access? Certainly, in the fridge case, one knows 
how the lights work since humans build fridges. That is not in question. We do not, however, 
know how the brain produces consciousness and whether accessibility is a genuine necessary 
condition on phenomenal awareness. That is in question. Though, many endorse premise (1), I 
deny that they have empirical grounds for doing so. Rather, commitment to (1) is an epistemic 
and metaphysical commitment that goes beyond the empirical evidence.  
 
32 Stanislas Dehaene and Lionel Naccache, “Towards a Cognitive Neuroscience of 
Consciousness: Basic Evidence and a Workspace Framework,” Cognition, LXXIX, 1 (2001): 1–
37. 
 
Unencumbered by a misconception of the empirical evidence, we can reconsider the 
reasons for holding (1). The challenge is that alternative routes to supporting the access condition 
in (1) might beg the central question of how consciousness and agency are linked. The 
conceptual access condition that lies behind (1) invokes a specific type of action as a condition 
on consciousness, namely the possibility of report. This relies on a link between consciousness 
and conceptualization, a function of the ventral stream. To endorse (1) is to endorse a narrow 
access condition as necessary for phenomenal consciousness. Yet even if we agree that access 
consciousness is definitionally linked to behavior, why should consciousness be limited by a 
narrow type of behavior at the get go, namely access of the form available only to conceptual 
creatures? 
 Consider an alternative condition of access that is broader in its purview regarding 
agency:  
 
A representation is access-conscious if it is poised for free use in intentional behavior, 
including reasoning and the direct “rational” control of action and speech.33 
 
Conceptual access, say in report or reasoning, is a type of intentional access but not all 
intentional access is conceptual access. Methodologically, in studying consciousness in humans, 
we prioritize conceptual access because we prioritize introspective reports and justification. As 
an epistemic or methodological principle, that priority is appropriate. Yet it would beg current 
questions to move from a methodological principle to a metaphysical requirement on 
consciousness. Even if access is a condition on phenomenal consciousness, perhaps it is access in 
the more general sense of intentional access that provides the proper constraint, something 
available to non-conceptual creatures as well. Methodological ease is one thing, 
anthropocentricism another.  
Consider an alternative which contradicts the conceptual access condition as necessary 
for phenomenal consciousness. We might call this the conscious intentional agency principle, 
here applied to vision. 
 
If a visual state plays a guiding role in intentional action, i.e. is intentionally accessible, then that 
state is conscious.34 
 
Experience Based Control affirms the role of conscious experience in motor engagement with 
the world and since it is (presumably) universally quantified across actions and visual states that 
guide action, this entails the conscious intentional agency principle: If conscious visual 
experience is active in control and guidance of fine-tuned motor engagement with the world, 
 
33 One might say that this is effectively Block’s condition (B) on access, so intentional and 
rational control amount to the same thing, say because the notion of an intentional action is tied 
to some notion of a reason for action. I am not sure that the ideas are equivalent. For example, 
one might think that there could be intentional yet substantively irrational action. To avoid 
hornet nests in respect of terminology, I drop the rubric rational access in favor of the likely 
broader idea.  
34 For an account of guidance that ties it to attention, see Wayne Wu, “Experts and Deviants: The 
Story of Agentive Control,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XCIII, 1 (July, 2016): 
101-26. 
then conscious visual experience is active in intentional forms.35 This allows us to test claims 
about consciousness via intentional behavior of which conceptual behavior is a proper subset. 
 Our discussion of the neuropsychological cases becomes relevant, for it is thought that 
these provide counterexamples to the intentional access condition. All neuropsychological 
subjects in the lab in published experiments act intentionally even if they do so with little 
confidence in their vision. Stoerig, Zontanou and Cowey, in adducing blindsight, noted: 
 
In view of the striking dissociations between behavior and awareness demonstrated in 
man, here in particular that of blindsight, the presence of visually guided behavior is 
insufficient to establish whether an animal is still consciously aware of the stimulus that 
provokes a motor response.36  
 
DF poses a similar problem to the intentional access condition, yet if the arguments from DF and 
blindsight fail because of unreliable introspection, then the neuropsychological data does not 
pose a challenge to the intentional access condition as commonly assumed. This is just to say 
that there are no empirical forces pushing us in the direction of conceptual access as opposed to 
intentional access. These are metaphysical issues. Recognizing this puts us in a position to 
discuss which notion of access is required anew. 
 What might the correct lessons from the biology of primate vision be? Milner, Goodale, 
Ungerleider and Mishkin emphasize that in normal visually guided intentional behavior, both 
streams work seamlessly together. The additional view from Milner and Goodale is that the 
biological division emphasizes a subjective division between vision for action and vision for 
perception, the latter being conscious, the former not. I have argued against the assumptions 
driving that division. Consider a different view freed from unreliable introspection and the 
assumption of conceptual access. The biological division emphasizes that visual awareness, a 
subject’s seeing, is divided in its neural basis with respect to output. Some aspects of visual 
awareness allow us to talk about it. Other aspects allow us to move accurately in light of 
awareness. It was a seminal discovery that visual awareness can be divided, given its neural 
basis, in respect of the type of actions it controls. On this view, visual states, however realized, 
count as phenomenally conscious, and the biology identifies different aspects of conscious 
guidance of primate action. I am not here arguing that both streams contribute to consciousness 
though differently to action, only that this position should be seriously considered.37  
 
35 The position is not that intentional agency is necessary for consciousness, only that it is 
sufficient.  
36 Petra Stoerig, Aspasia Zontanou, Alan Cowey “Aware or unaware: assessment of cortical 
blindness in four men and a monkey,” Cerebral Cortex, XII, 6 (2002): 565-74, at p. 565. 
37 On the current view, intentional action provides an evidential base for the presence of 
consciousness. Thus, the possibility of introspective intentional action will as well. So, if we 
accept the intentional agency principle, the presence of intentional agency, as in DF’s motor 
actions, provides evidence that DF is in a conscious visual state. An open question concerns what 
If visual consciousness is necessarily unified, doesn’t the intentional agency principle 
allow that for cases where it is not? One might think this by focusing on conceptual access which 
demands a narrow unity in conceptualization. On that view, if there are two states of 
consciousness, they must be unified in a specific type of action, conceptualization in thought or 
verbal report. The two states must be of the sort that can be jointly conceptualized, so that we 
can, in principle, report their features together. This condition figured in my argument for 
zombie action.38 
In fact, the intentional agency principle conjoined with understanding primate biology 
suggests an alternative. Certainly, verbal report or thought about experience is one intentional 
response to it, but there are other responses available. In the normal case, if there are two states 
of consciousness, they are unified in intentional action writ large. So, if I intend to drink from a 
glass, my ventral stream locates a target that fits my conception of what I have to do. Here, my 
seeing involves visual recognition of the target as appropriate to my intended action, and it 
engages my intention so I am motivated to act. Then, I intentionally reach for that target guided 
by my seeing it, seeing that depends on the activity of the dorsal stream as well. My seeing the 
object guides my intentional action in a multifaceted way that is subserved by different parts of 
the visual system. The different moments of awareness are unified not in the sense that I can 
verbally report all those contents, but more broadly because I can intentionally act on all of them. 
Such intentional unity would be the basis of phenomenal unity. 
I do not take any of this to settle controversial issues about access and the phenomenal. 
The point is to emphasize that there are issues to be settled. It has been thought that the empirical 
data supports unconscious vision in the dorsal stream, but this data relies on unreliable 
introspection. Our understanding of the biology of vision itself suggests that we should not use 
such data. Alternative routes to zombie action depend on metaphysical assumptions about the 
relation between access and phenomenal consciousness but these assumptions are highly 
controversial.  
The issue between consciousness and agency, as exemplified in access, must be 
reconsidered. One view is that visual consciousness became available when conceptual access 
 
might count as empirical evidence for the absence of consciousness in dorsal stream vision (I am 
grateful for a referee’s query here). One possibility is this. If we had a well-developed 
neuroscience of consciousness with a detailed list of neural correlates of visual states, we might 
find a situation where we detect a neural correlate of a visual state but find no evidence that the 
state can engage introspection or any other intentional action. Under those conditions, we might 
take the state to be unconscious. Still, given a disconnection from intentional action, one might 
wonder whether the state is attributable to a subject and whether it is the type of state that could 
be conscious. These matters warrant further discussion than I am able to give them here. 
38 Wu, “The Case for Zombie Action” op. cit. p. 224. 
became available. A different view is that visual consciousness became available when 
intentional access became available. While visual consciousness certainly was transformed by its 
connection to rationality, reason and conceptualization, recognizing this change is consistent 
with recognizing that visual consciousness was in play in a more direct way when subjects of all 
sorts, human and non-human, began to act intentionally. 
 
 
